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Lis Pendens and Procedural Due Process
Because of the recent and expanding protection of procedural
due process,' the lis pendens statute has been subject to re-evalua-
tion. Lake Tullock Corporation v. Dingman2 recently declared the
lis pendens statute violated procedural due process in not providing
for notice and hearing prior to recordation of the notice. In Emp-
field v. Superior Court,' the constitutionality of the lis pendens
statute was upheld without discussion of the relevant issues in-
volved.
This note will analyze the application of procedural due process
to the lis pendens statute in the light of the recent trend to ex-
pand procedural due process protections to all summary prejudg-
ment remedies which deprive a person of a significant property
interest without prior notice and hearing. Two distinct problems
are raised by the procedure itself: first, whether there has been
a deprivation of a significant property interest; second, assuming
a deprivation of a significant property interest, whether the lis
pendens statute, narrowly drawn and limited only to actions affect-
ing title or the right of possession to real property, is a circum-
stance requiring special protection to a state or creditor interest.
This note will attempt to illustrate how a reasonable interpreta-
tion of Sniadach v Family Finance Corp.4 and subsequent decisions
do not include the lis pendens procedure within their scope.
In an action concerning real property, including issues of title
or the right of possession, the plaintiff may file a notice of pend-
ency with the county recorder at the same time he files his civil
complaint. The defendant may do so when he files his answer
or at any time thereafter. Such notice may only be filed in the
county where the realty is located.5 The notice is to contain the
names of the parties, the object of the action or defense, and a
1. See notes and accompanying text, infra.
2. Civil No. WEC 27140 (West Los Angeles County Superior Court,
Memorandum of Decision filed June 1, 1973).
3. 33 Cal. App. 3d 105, 108, 108 Cal. Rptr. 375, 377 (1973).
4. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
5. CAL. CODE OF CIvI PROC. § 409 (West 1973).
description of the property.6 The purpose of a recordation of a
statutory notice of lis pendens is merely to furnish constructive
notice to all interested persons of the pendency of the action.
The scope of the lis pendens statute is limited to actions con-
cerning real property or those which affect the title or the right
of possession of real property. The statute provides for a method
of immediate review at any time after notice of pendency of an
action has been recorded. The court in which the action is pend-
ing shall order the notice expunged if it is shown to the satisfac-
tion of the court by "clear and convincing proof" that the action
"does not affect title to or right of possession of the real property
described in the notice; or insofar as the action affects title to or
right of possession of the real property described in the notice the
party recording the notice has commenced or prosecuted the action
for an improper purpose or not in good faith. '7 At any time after
notice of pendency of the action has been recorded, the court
may order the notice expunged upon the filing of an undertaking
in an amount fixed by the court." An order granting or denying
a motion to expunge the lis pendens is reviewable by petition for
writ of mandate. 9
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.10 established that before a
state can deprive a person of a significant property interest, prior
notice and hearing must be afforded." Since Sniadach, the due
process clause has undergone an expanding interpretation in Cali-
fornia resulting in a host of attacks ,on a wide variety of prejudg-
ment creditor remedies. 12 Such deficiency procedures include gar-
nishment of wages and attachment procedures. "  Lien statutes
have been struck down.' 4 Statutes authorizing claim and delivery
of personal property15 and seizure of real property through a writ
6. Id.
7. Id., § 409.1 (West 1973).
8. Id., § 409.2 (West 1973).
9. Id., § 409.4 (West 1973).
10. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
11. Id.
12. McCallop v. Carberry, 1 Cal. 3d 903, 464 P.2d 122, 83 Cal. Rptr.
666 (1970).
13. Randone v. Appellate Department, 5 Cal. 3d 536, 488 P.2d 13, 96
Cal. Rptr. 709 (1970).
14. Klim v. Jones, 315 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. Cal. 1970) (California Inn-
keeper's Lien).
15. Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 486 P.2d 1242, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42
(1971).
[VOL. 1: 433, 1974] Lis Pendens
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
of immediate possession16 have also been declared to violate the
mandate of procedural due process. Many of the conflicts of opin-
ion concerning the expansive or restrictive reading to be given
Sniadach were resolved by the United States Supreme Court in
Fuentes v. Shevin' 7 in which the Court refused to limit the appli-
cation of Sniadach to absolute necessities. Thus, the general rule
is that prejudgment remedies not providing notice and hearing
opportunity violate procedural due process except in extraordi-
nary situations.
Whether or not a prior hearing is required in a given situation
is dependent upon a judicial weighing of the seriousness of the
deprivation against the importance 'of the governmental or public
interest served by summary procedure.' 8  In certain areas, the
existence and severity of the deprivation are not questioned. For
example, where the individual is threatened with the deprivation
of title to or possession of property, or where he is completely
deprived of the use and enjoyment of the property, there is no
question. The test against which the validity of the lis pendens
procedure must be measured is two pronged: first, whether 'the
deprivation can be classified as "insignificant" or "de minimus;"
and second, whether the lis pendens procedure constitutes that ex-
traordinary situation which justifies postponing the hearing until
after the event.
LAKE TULLOCH
In Lake Tulloch Corporation v. Dingman 9 the plaintiffs sued
the defendant, Dingman, for breach of contract, mismanagement
and fraudulent misrepresentations in connection with the operation
and development of a subdivision known as Poker Flat Resort, lo-
cated at Tulloch Lake in Calaveras County. Title to the property
was vested in the plaintiff corporation. The defendant was at one
time the president and managed the enterprise.
The defendant filed a cross-complaint, joining as cross-defend-
ants the plaintiffs and the previous owners of the property, alleg-
16. Mihans v. Municipal Court, 7 Cal. App. 3d 479, 87 Cal. Rptr. 17
(1970).
17. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
18. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378-79 (1971).
19. Supra, note 2.
ing that a written contract had been entered into between the
cross-complainant, Dingman, and the previous owners to purchase
the property and seeking damages in the amount of $6,000,000
against the previous owners. In the cross-complaint, Dingman al-
leged he assigned the contract to the Lake Tulloch Corporation
in consideration of a 50% interest in the venture and a salary of
$3,000 a month.
A demurrer to the cross-complaint was sustained and a first
amended cross-complaint was filed which again sought only money
damages. A demurrer to the first amended cross-complaint was
also sustained.
Prior to filing the second amended cross-complaint, a lis pendens
was recorded by the cross-complainant, Dingman, on the real prop-
erty owned by the cross-defendant, Lake Tulloch Corporation. A
motion to expunge the lis pendens was filed by the cross-defend-
ants. The second amended cross-complaint was then filed predi-
cated on new facts in conflict with facts in the two previous cross-
complaints and including causes of action allegedly concerning real
property in order to justify the recordation of the lis pendens.
Taking judicial notice of the facts alleged in the two previous
cross-complaints seeking only money damages, the Court expunged
the lis pendens declaring the cross-complainant did not possess an
interest in real property or have a right of possession thereto which
would warrant the recordation of the lis pendens.
The Court in Lake Tulloch then proceeded to discuss the consti-
tutionality of the lis pendens statute relying principally upon the
California Supreme Court case of Randone v. Appellate Depart-
ment 20 which declared 'that a segment of the prejudgment attach-
ment statute violated procedural due process in not affording no-
tice and an opportunity for a hearing prior to the deprivation of
a significant property interest.
The Court went on to state that "in a real sense where lis pen-
dens is resorted to the owner is deprived -of the use of his property
by restricting the marketability of his property." 21 The common
fear of exceptions in a title company report makes the mere notice,
once recorded, a severe restriction upon the marketability of land.
Thus, the owner of the property "is as much deprived of the use
of his property where a lis pendens is recorded as the depositor
20. 5 Cal. 3d 536, 488 P.2d 13, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1971).
21. Lake Tulloch Corp. v. Dingman, Civil No. WEC 27140 (West Los
Angeles County Superior Court, Memorandum of Decision filed June 1,
1973).
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whose bank account has been attached. '22 The Court concluded
that the lis pendens procedure did not present any "extraordinary
circumstance or a countervailing state interest of overriding sig-
nificance" 23 which would distinguish the lis pendens procedure
from other summary prejudgment procedures already held to vio-
late procedural due process.
In Lake Tulloch the Court, in declaring the lis pendens statute
unconstitutional, relied substantially upon the effect the recorda-
tion of the lis pendens would have on a subsequent attempt to
sell the land during the pending law suit. Once the lis pendens
appears on the record, the landowner will be hard pressed to find
either prospective purchasers or respectable lending institutions
willing to deal with the property.24 The threat of loss of profits
or purchasers will force the property owner to settle and to settle
quickly.
PROTECTION OF A STATE OR CREDITOR INTEREST
It is important to point out that all prejudgment remedies held
unconstitutional in the aftermath of Sniadach have suffered from
the same constitutional infirmity, overbreadth. In Randone, the
statute which authorized prejudgment attachment of any property
of the debtor defendant without prior notice or hearing, was held
to be fatally "overbroad." The statute had not been narrowly
drawn to confine such deprivation to those "extradordinary cir-
cumstances in which a state or creditor interest of overriding sig-
nificance" must justify summary procedures. 25
Although the issue was not decided, the Court in Randone indi-
cated:
Because the attachment of real estate does not deprive an owner
of the use of his property, but merely constitutes a lien on the
property, the "taking" generated by such attachment is frequently
less severe than that arising from other attachments. In view of
this basic difference in the effect of such attachment, it has been
suggested that a statute which dealt solely with the attachment
of real estate might possibly involve constitutional considerations
of a different magnitude than those discussed hereafter. (Cita-
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. 39 CALIF. L. REV. 108 (1966).
25. 5 Cal. 3d 536, 546, 488 P.2d 13, 19, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709, 715 (1971).
tion) The instant statute is not so limited, however, and the great
majority of cases arising under it do involve the deprivation of
an owner's use of his property; thus we have no occasion in this
proceeding to speculate as to the constitutionality of a prejudg-
ment attachment provision which does not significantly impair
such use.26
The lis pendens statute is such a narrowly drawn statute, i.e.
it is limited to actions affecting title to real property or the right
to possession thereof.2 7 Thus, it does not appear to suffer from
the constitutional infirmity of "overbreadth."
Also, the lis pendens procedure does not appear to constitute a
taking a deprivation of a significant property interest in violation
of procedural due process. All prejudgment remedies held uncon-
stitutional since Sniadach have dealt with an actual taking and
denial of the beneficial use and enjoyment of property.
In Black Watch Farms, Inc. v. Dick,28 the Court held that notice
or hearing opportunity before prejudgment attachment of real
property of a resident defendant is not required because due proc-
ess was satisfied by 'the subsequent hearing in the main action.
The Court further emphasized that the owner of the property is
neither deprived of the use or enjoyment of the property pending
a trial on the merits, nor is his livelihood threatened by the depri-
vation of the right to freely transfer the realty. A real property
attachment is not a final proceeding nor is it unduly harsh; there-
fore, there is no necessity for prior notice or hearing opportunity
since due process is satisfied by the subsequent plenary hearing
in the main action.
The prohibition of the Fourteenth Amendment forbidding the
deprivation of property without due process refers only to direct ap-
proriation.29 The lis pendens procedure involves no direct appro-
priation of property, nor does the incidental effect of impairing
marketability constitute a "deprivation" of property protected by
the due process clause.
The deprivation which results from the filing 'of a lis pendens
is de minimis. The creditors' remedies thus far invalidated have
completely deprived the owner of 'the use of his property. Although
the notice incidentally hampers use, in 'that selling the property
or borrowing on the property may be more difficult, it in no way
prevents sale, encumbrance or lease of the property.
26. Id., at 545, 488 P.2d at -, 96 Cal. Rptr. at -.
27. CAL. CODE OF CIVIL PROC. § 409 (West 1973).
28. 323 F. Supp. 100 (1971).
29. California Teachers Assn. v. Newport Mesa Unified School Dist., 333
F. Supp. 436, 443 (1971).
438
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Assuming arguendo that the lis pendens procedure violates pro-
cedural due process in not providing for notice and a hearing op-
portunity, the lis pendens statute, narrowly drawn and limited
only to actions affecting title or the right of possession to real prop-
erty, constitutes a circumstance "requiring special protection to a
state or creditor interest. '5 0
In Property Research Financial Corp. v. Superior Court"' the
Court, in upholding the constitutionality of prejudgment attach-
ment of a nonresident debtor's property, emphasized the state and
creditor interest to be protected:
The creditor's need to safeguard the collectibility of a judgment
is substantially greater when the debtor is a resident, for a non-
resident has contacts and roots outside the state which make it
far more likely he will be willing and able to transfer assets out-
side the state to defeat his creditor's recovery than is true in the
case of a resident debtor. Prior notice and hearing inevitably pro-
vide the non-resident debtor with opportunity to defeat the pri-
mary purpose of foreign attachment by transferring his assets to
his home state before the desired attachment can take affect. In
summary attachment against non-residents, the element of surprise
is vital to the effectiveness of the procedure and indispensable to
the state's interest in making its process locally effective. The
principle is much the same as that embodied in the statutes allow-
ing summary filing of a lis pendens at the commencement of prop-
erty litigation (Code Civ. Proc. § 409): the subject matter of the
litigation should be preserved until a hearing is held on the merits
in order to make the judgment of the court practically enforce-
able. Although ownership of the attached property may not itself
be at issue, its preservation against willful or negligent dissipation
or its sale to innocent purchasers is often necessary if the court
is to do full justice to a plaintiff with a valid claim.3 2
The purpose to be served by the lis pendens procedure parallels
that of prejudgment attachment of a non-resident debtor's prop-
erty which involves a situation requiring a special protection to
a state and creditor interest. The function of notice of pendency
of action involving realty is to carry out the public policy that
a party's interest in the realty shall not be defeated by an aliena-
30. Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 339 (1969); Prop-
erty Research Financial Corp. v. Superior Court, 23 Cal. App. 3d 413, 421,
100 Cal. Rptr. 233, 238 (1972); Banks v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. App. 3d
143, 146, 102 Cal. Rptr. 590, 592 (1972); Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Waegele,
29 Cal. App. 3d 681, 685, 105 Cal. Rptr. 914, 916 (1972).
31. 23 Cal. App. 3d 413, 100 Cal. Rptr. 233 (1972).
32. Id., at 416-20, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 237-38.
tion of the property during the course of the lawsuit. The subject
matter of the litigation, i.e. rights and interests in the real property
and the profits therefrom, should be preserved until a hearing is
held on the merits in order to make the judgment of the court
practically enforceable. This effectively protects the party who
claims an interest in the real property against willful or negligent
dissipation or sales to innocent purchasers. It also protects the
state's interest in making its process effective and insures collecti-
bility of the judgment.
In balancing the claim of the state and the creditor to effective
process against the property owner's claim to due process, it is
noteworthy that a recordation of a lis pendens does not involve
necessities for day-to-day living. In this respect it contrasts with
the garnishment of wages in Sniadach and the attachment of a
bank account in Randone. The creditor's need for security is great,
particularly when the dispute involves land. An action for specific
performance for the sale of real property by one claiming owner-
ship would be of little importance if a bona fide purchaser for
value and without notice of the pending action acquired the prop-
erty during the pendency of the lawsuit. Thus, the creditor has
a substantial and legitimate claim to due process of law in the
protection and collection of what is owed him, and, in this sense,
the creditor's interest presents a competing claim to due process
of law. Furthermore, to facilitate the countervailing state inter-
est in an orderly recording and notice system for real estate trans-
actions, it is imperative that there be a method for notifying pros-
pective buyers of pending litigation concerning the property.83
CONCLUSION
In Lake Tulloch the Court first held that the cross-complainant
who recorded the lis pendens did not possess an interest in real
property or present any claim affecting title or right of possession
thereto which would warrant the recordation of a lis p endens. The
Court then expunged the filing of the notice of lis pendens as pro-
vided by the statutory scheme34 to protect the owner of the prop-
erty from false claims to the property. The Court then, however,
proceeded to decide a constitutional issue not necessary to the case.
It is an accepted rule of constitutional law that the Court will
not pass upon a constitutional question in advance of the necessity
of deciding it. Thus, if a case can be decided on either of two
33. Empfield v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. App. 3d 105, 108, 108 Cal. Rptr.
375, 377 (1973).
34. CAL. CoD OF CIviL PRoc. § 409.1 (West 1973).
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grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a ques-
tion of statutory construction or general law, the Court will de-
cide only the latter.3 5
The Court in Lake Tulloch failed to adequately balance: the
state's interest in insuring that its process is locally effective and
practically enforceable, the interest of the state in an orderly re-
cording and notice system for transactions in real property, and
the creditor's interest in effective process against the property
owner's claim to due process. The lis pendens procedure presents
a "countervailing state and creditor interest of overriding signifi-
cance"8 6 which distinguishes it from the summary prejudgment
procedures already held to violate procedural due process. Ade-
quate protection against false claims is provided by a motion to
expunge the lis pendens.37 As was stated in Randone, "what is
due process depends on circumstances and varies with the subject
matter and necessities of the situation."38  The subject matter, i.e.
real property and necessities of the situation, i.e. protection of state
and creditor interests, sustains the lis pendens against procedural
due process claims.
WILLIAm B. HANLEY
35. Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 345-48 (1936).
36. Supra, note 29.
37. CAL. CODE Or CIVIL Peoc. § 409.1 (West 1973).
38. 5 Cal. 3d 536, 558, 488 P.2d 13, 28, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709, 724 (1971).
